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Abstract
With reference to its unique characteristics, the European Union (EU) regularly requests a
special position in treaty cooperation or external judicial control mechanisms. Recurrently,
these requests are successful and lead to the EU being treated differently from other
treaty parties. These situations have been captured by the concept of ‘European
exceptionalism’. EU requests for special treatment can also bewitnessed in the supportive
and facilitative procedures of compliance mechanisms in international environmental
law. In those mechanisms, however, EU requests for special treatment are subject to
careful scrutiny, and are even met with strong opposition by treaty institutions and treaty
partners. Taking a closer look at the EU’s participation in compliance mechanisms, the
present article discusses how certain unique EU characteristics may prompt an EU request
for special treatment under compliance mechanisms and explores how compliance
institutions and treaty partners have treated existing requests so far. With this outside
perspective of non-EU actors, it is possible to understand where such requests can be
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successful and where they fail to be. In this way, the insights gained permit reflection
upon the EU’s participation in compliance mechanisms and whether it truly constitutes a
further phenomenon of ‘European exceptionalism’.
Keywords international environmental law; compliance mechanisms; EU external
relations; external control mechanisms
1. Introduction
As an active international actor, the European Union (EU) participates in very different ways in
international cooperation. While some of these ways have been studied extensively, others have not
received much attention so far. The EU’s participation in non-confrontational and supportive multilateral
environmental compliance mechanisms falls into this latter category.1 Only recently has this type of EU
external action drawn the attention of a broader audience,2 when the EU requested, with reference to its
unique characteristics, special treatment under the compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Convention3
and was refused such treatment.
The making of requests for EU special treatment is indeed quite well known from other areas of
the EU’s external engagement, specifically treaty negotiations and its participation in external judicial
control mechanisms.4 In view of this observed behaviour, international law scholars, who took inspiration
from debates held in a US context, have been prompted to study, and also to criticise, such situations as
phenomena of ‘European exceptionalism’.5 The concept is indeed defined differently, depending on the
purpose of the respective analysis.6 In a descriptive sense though, it may be summarised as capturing
situations in which, with reference to its unique characteristics, the EU requests, and receives, different
treatment under a treaty from other parties.7 Analyses relying on the concept in this way are motivated
by an interest in whether and how the EU is treated differently, leaving a normative assessment aside.8
Sharing this interest in whether and how the EU is treated differently, the present article uses
the concept of ‘European exceptionalism’ as a lens through which to study the EU’s participation in
compliance mechanisms. For this purpose, the article first briefly introduces compliance mechanisms
in international environmental law and subsequently discusses how certain unique EU characteristics
may prompt an EU request for special treatment under such mechanisms. It then takes the viewpoint
of compliance institutions and treaty partners to explore three cases of EU requests for special
treatment under compliance mechanisms. By taking an external perspective on these requests, it
seeks to shed more light on whether and how EU requests lead to its special treatment under these
1See Antonio Alì, ‘Non-Compliance Procedures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Interaction between
International Law and European Union Law’ in Tullio Treves, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni and Laura Pineschi (eds),
Non-Compliance Procedures andMechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (TMC Asser Press
2009) 521. From an EU law perspective, Antonio Alì, ‘The EU and the Compliance Mechanisms of Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: The Case of the Aarhus Convention’ in Elisa Morgera (ed), The External Environmental Policy of the European Union
(CUP 2012) 287.
2e.g. Laurens Ankersmit, ‘An Incoherent Approach Towards Aarhus and CETA: The Commission and External Oversight
Mechanisms’ in Inge Govaere and Sacha Garben (eds), The Interface Between EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2019) 321;
Christina Eckes, EU Powers under External Pressure: How the EU’s External Actions Alter Its Internal Structures (OUP 2019) 186.
3Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
2161 UNTS 447.
4See, e.g., Christina Eckes, ‘The European Court of Justice and (Quasi-)Judicial Bodies of International Organisations’ in
Ramses A Wessel and Steven Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and Dependence. The EU Legal Order Under the Influence of
International Organisations (T.M.C. Asser Press 2013) 85.
5e.g. Magdalena Ličková, ‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 463,
477ff; Sabrina Safrin, ‘The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1307, 1323ff;
Anu Bradford and Eric A Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 14ff;
Turkuler Isiksel, ‘European Exceptionalism and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law
565, 577ff.
6Jed Odermatt, ‘Facultative Mixity in the International Legal Order: Tolerating European Exceptionalism?’ in Merijn Chamon
and Inge Govaere (eds), EU External Relations Post-Lisbon. The Law and Practice of Facultative Mixity (Brill Nijhoff 2020) 291, 296f.
7See Safrin (n 5) 1313. Such requests can also be made by the EU’s Member States with reference to their obligations under EU
law, Ličková (n 5) 477ff.
8Including such an assessment, e.g. Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘European Exceptionalism?’ (2013) 2 Global
Constitutionalism 407, 413ff.
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mechanisms. Equipped with these insights, it identifies EU characteristics which may warrant special
treatment in the eyes of external actors and reflects on whether the treatment accorded indeed allows
for understanding the EU’s participation in compliance mechanisms as yet another phenomenon of
‘European exceptionalism’.
2. Compliance mechanisms in multilateral environmental
agreements
Within a rather short period of time, compliance mechanisms have become ‘a sort of “must”’ in
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).9 These mechanisms have their roots in the idea of treaty
management as pioneered by Chayes and Chayes, who argued centrally that non-compliance under
treaties was not a wilful act of treaty parties.10 After all, States have negotiated the respective treaty to
which they are party and would generally consider such a negotiated outcome less inequitable than the
available alternatives. Consequently, there ‘was no reason to suppose that States are prone ordinarily to
disregard [their] obligation to obey the law’.11
Rather than a wilful act, Chayes and Chayes maintained that non-compliance was a consequence of
different factors such as capacity problems but also of treaty design.12 In their research they highlighted,
for example, that the design of environmental treaties such as the Montreal Protocol had generally
challenged States.13 While the reduction obligation under the Montreal Protocol is framed as a State
obligation, it was ultimately necessary to regulate behaviour of businesses and individuals. Whether the
respective domestic systems would be successful in this regard would only become apparent over time.
Thus, States ‘have not been able to construct such systems with the confidence that they will achieve the
desired objective’.14 It would follow that reasons such as these, which underlie non-compliance, could
clearly not be resolved by sanctioning non-compliant behaviour.15 Instead, it was much more helpful to
provide treaty parties with assistance and support, and mechanisms allowing for clarifying and adapting
treaty obligations.16 In this spirit, mechanisms of treaty management would be based on a cooperative
and inclusive dialogue with the treaty parties.17 The aim of this dialogue would be to identify the reasons
for non-compliance and suitable solutions.18 The continued interaction between the treaty institutions
and parties facilitated by this dialogue was meant to ultimately induce a sense of obligation to comply
with treaty obligations.19
Compliance mechanisms, as included in MEAs today, effectuate Chayes and Chayes’ idea of treaty
management.20 While these treaty-specific mechanisms consist of multiple elements,21 non-compliance
procedures are a central one: these procedures are designed to allow for the vital constructive dialogue
between treaty institutions and treaty parties, seeking to instigate compliance.22 This purpose, and their
design, distinguishes them from international courts and tribunals.
9Attila Tanzi and Cesare Pitea, ‘Non-Compliance Mechanisms: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward’ in Tullio Treves, Attila
Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni and Laura Pineschi (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of
International Environmental Agreements (Springer 2009) 569, 569.
10Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ (1993) 47 International Organization 175, 188.
11Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Ronald Mitchell, ‘Active Compliance Management in Environmental Treaties’ in
Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable Development and International Law (Kluwer 1995) 75, 79. Note, however, Martti Koskenniemi,
‘Comment on the Paper by Antonia Handler Chayes, Abram Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell’ in Winfried Lang (ed), Sustainable
Development and International Law (Kluwer 1995) 91, 93.
12Chayes and Handler Chayes (n 10) 178.
13Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1522 UNTS 3.
14Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (Harvard University Press 1995) 14.
15Chayes and Handler Chayes (n 10) 178.
16Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behaviour under Regulatory Treaties’
(1991) 7 Negotiation Journal 311, 325ff.
17Chayes and Handler Chayes (n 14) 230f.
18Chayes, Handler Chayes and Mitchell (n 11) 84.
19ibid 88. See, however, Günther Handl, ‘International “Lawmaking” by Conferences of the Parties and Other Politically
Mandated Bodies’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (Springer
2005) 125, 138.
20Jutta Brunnée, ‘Compliance Control’ in Geir Ulfstein, Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmerman (eds), Making Treaties Work.
Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (CUP 2007) 373, 380.
21For a broad definition of compliance mechanisms, see UNEP (ed), Compliance Mechanisms under Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (2007) 9.
22See Tanzi and Pitea (n 9) 579.
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Non-compliance procedures can be initiated in different ways (‘triggering’). Central is the possibility
for a treaty party to initiate a procedure with regard to its own situation (‘self-triggering’). In this way,
a treaty party can submit to the supportive procedure to discuss any difficulties it experiences with
achieving compliance.23 So-called party-to-party triggering is more controversial.24 These possibilities
permit a treaty party to request the opening of the procedure in respect of another treaty party. Yet,
even though these possibilities exist to allow for protecting the common interest of treaty parties,25
they are very rarely used. Despite the supportive nature of the process, treaty parties appear to
consider it inappropriate to put another party under scrutiny.26 To ensure non-compliance procedures
are nevertheless used as regularly as possible, additional possibilities to initiate these procedures exist.
At times, treaty institutions have the possibility to trigger the procedure where they become aware
of any difficulties of a party.27 In some settings, even members of the public, mainly environmental
non-governmental organisations (eNGOs), are accorded triggering rights.28 However, State actors
appear reluctant to provide such rights more generally.29 This tendency is indeed regrettable as an
opening of the mechanism in this way could enhance its effectiveness, and even its legitimacy.30
Once initiated, the non-compliance procedure is generally structured as a two-stage process.
Increasingly, the first stage is governed by treaty institutions which are specifically mandated to deal
with compliance matters (further ‘compliance bodies’).31 These compliance bodies have different
compositions. The compliance body under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP),32 for example, comprises a limited number of State representatives.33 Conversely,
the compliance body under the Water Convention34 is staffed with experts serving in their
individual capacity.35
Irrespective of their formal composition though, compliance bodies are mandated to deal with
compliance matters by assessing a situation of a treaty party in view of treaty obligations.36 The
assessment of compliance bodies is included in a report or the like, usually directed to the treaty’s
plenary political body.37 Widely, compliance bodies are competent to include recommendations for
measures to support a treaty party found non-compliant in rectifying the situation.38 Examples of such
measures include access to technical assistance or the offering of expert advice.39 Taking into account
the role and competences of compliance bodies in the two-stage process, their assessment cannot be
23See Brunnée (n 20) 383.
24Francesca Romanin Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-Compliance Procedures’ in Tullio Treves, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni
and Laura Pineschi (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements (Springer 2009) 373, 375. More directly, Hugh Adsett, Anne Daniel, Masud Husain and Ted L McDorman, ‘Compliance
Committees and Recent Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The Canadian Experience with Their Negotiation and Operation’
(2004) 42 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 91, 108: ‘the very antithesis of a non-confrontational process’.
25Peter Sand, ‘Institution-Building to Assist Compliance with International Environmental Law: Perspectives’ (1996) ZaöRV
774, 784.
26See Meinhard Doelle, ‘Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA Compliance System
Design’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 237, 256.
27Note, though, Geir Ulfstein, ‘Dispute Resolution, Compliance Control and Enforcement in Environmental Law’ in Geir Ulfstein,
Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmerman (eds), Making Treaties Work. Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (CUP 2007)
115, 127.
28See Sebastian Oberthür and René Lefeber, ‘Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revisited
after Four Years of Experience’ (2010) 1 Climate Law 133, 141.
29Patrick Széll, ‘Supervising the Observance of MEAs’ (2007) 37 Environmental Policy and Law 80, 82.
30In depth, Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes:
Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2011) 24 Journal of Environmental
Law 103, 122ff.
31Peter Davies, ‘Non-Compliance – A Pivotal or Secondary Function of CoP Governance?’ (2013) 15 International Community
Law Review 77, 78.
321302 UNTS 217.
33LRTAP, Executive Body Decision 1997/2, para 1.
34Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1936 UNTS 269.
35Water Convention, MoP Decision VI/1, Annex I, II.3 and II.4.
36Brunnée (n 20) 380.
37See Veit Koester, ‘The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)’ in Geir Ulfstein, Thilo Marauhn and Andreas Zimmerman (eds),Making Treaties Work.
Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (CUP 2007) 179, 203.
38See Gerhard Loibl, ‘Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong and Panos Merkouris
(eds), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 426, 436.
39Ulfstein (n 27) 128.
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considered binding.40 Nevertheless, their assessment clearly has immense value for the treaty party to
whose situation they relate as it provides clarification for necessary behaviour under a treaty. In this
sense, the assessment can also be an instructive resource to other treaty parties for evaluating their
own situation.
The second stage of the non-compliance procedure is governed by the plenary political body of
a treaty, usually the Conference or Meeting of the Parties (CoP or MoP). The plenary political body
builds on the results of the procedure’s first stage and reviews the compliance assessment.41 Ultimately,
the purpose of this review is to find acceptance among treaty parties for that assessment, its findings
and any proposed measures.42 This acceptance is ultimately reflected in the adoption of a so-called
non-compliance decision, usually by consensus.43
By confirming a situation of non-compliance, a non-compliance decision highlights that a party
does not yet fulfil obligations it owes its treaty partners.44 Recommendations included in the decision
aremeant to provide that party with options for possible action to rectify the situation,45 while not binding
the party to a specific action.46 In this light, non-compliance decisions do not establish a new obligation
to take action. Rather, this obligation already stems from the respective existing treaty obligation and
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.47 Nevertheless, non-compliance decisions clearly play a crucial role
in ensuring parties meet treaty standards: these decisions effectively underline and, together with the
included assessment, clarify a party’s obligations and inform the taking of action.48 This role is further
emphasised when measures such as reporting requirements demand that treaty parties account for the
action they have taken,49 or follow-up procedures exist to evaluate the progress in rectifying a situation
of non-compliance.50 While not obliging a party to act, such soft pressure can, in practice, be equally
powerful in inducing a change in behaviour.51
3. EU participation in compliance mechanisms: a closer look
The EU is party to numerous MEAs,52 of which a large number have also established compliance
mechanisms.53 While MEAs regularly accommodate, to some extent, the EU’s unique features, far less is
known about any such accommodating in the context of compliancemechanisms. An initial idea of which
characteristics may require accommodating, and how this could be done to create a special position for
the EU, can be developed by considering past situations in similar contexts. This initial idea serves as
a foundation for then examining case studies from compliance practice to explore whether compliance
institutions and treaty partners indeed grant the EU the special treatment it desires.
40Loibl (n 38) 436. In the context of the Aarhus Convention, Elena Fasoli and Alistair McGlone, ‘The Non-ComplianceMechanism
under the Aarhus Convention as “Soft” Enforcement of International Environmental Law: Not So Soft After All!’ (2018) 65
Netherlands International Law Review 27, 36ff.
41Brunnée (n 20) 382.
42See Svitlana Kravchenko, ‘The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements’
(2007) 18 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1, 14.
43See Loibl (n 38) 436.
44Enrico Milano, ‘The Outcomes of the Procedure and Their Legal Effects’ in Tullio Treves, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara
Ragni and Laura Pineschi (eds),Non-Compliance Procedures andMechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Agreements (Springer 2009) 407, 418.
45Loibl (n 38) 436.
46See Ankersmit (n 2) 326.
47Sand (n 25) 793.
48See Annecoos Wiersema, ‘Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: The New International
Law-Makers?’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 231, 286.
49See Tuomas Kuokkanen, ‘The Convention on Lang-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’ in Geir Ulfstein, Thilo Marauhn and
Andreas Zimmerman (eds),Making Treaties Work. Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control (CUP 2007) 161, 171.
50See Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law’ (2000)
31 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 35, 48f; Koester (n 37) 208ff.
51See Peter Sand, ‘The Role of Environmental Agreements’ Conferences of the Parties’ in Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine
Maljean-Dubois (eds), The Transformation of International Environmental Law (Bloomsbury 2011) 89, 92; Pierre-Marie Dupuy and
Jorge E Viñuales, International Environmental Law (2nd edn, CUP 2018) 347. Most recently, for an empirical assessment in the
context of the Aarhus Convention, Gor Samvel, ‘Non-Judicial, Advisory, Yet Impactful? The Aarhus Convention Compliance
Committee as a Gateway to Environmental Justice’ (2020) 9 Transnational Environmental Law 211, 231.
52Currently, the EU is party to over 50 MEAs, see European Commission, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (7 August 2019)
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/agreements_en.htm accessed 19 July 2021.
53In fact, 43 MEAs to which the EU is a party include compliance mechanisms, with some of them not yet being finalised, e.g.
the compliance mechanism under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2256 UNTS 119.
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3.1. The EU as a party to MEAs and to compliance mechanisms
At the international level, the EU’s unique characteristics are frequently accommodated in treaty relations,
also in MEAs. As compliance mechanisms are based in MEAs, the special treatment granted to
the EU under treaties is likely to be relevant to its participation in these mechanisms. The related
considerations can, however, also more broadly inspire ideas for how EU special treatment under
compliance mechanisms may present itself. This is also true for experiences gained in the context of
certain external control mechanisms where EU characteristics have challenged their design. After all,
compliance mechanisms are also control mechanisms, even if of a supportive nature. These situations
are thus equally valuable for developing an idea of which EU characteristics may be accommodated, and
how, under compliance mechanisms.
3.1.1. The EU’s nature as an international organisation
The EU’s status as an international organisation of sovereign States with its own international personality
has prompted accommodating in international cooperation in different ways.54 On the one hand, with
the EU not being a State actor, treaties need to authorise its participation in a treaty. For this purpose,
treaties typically include specific provisions in relation to a regional (economic) integration organisation
(REIO),55 enabling the EU to join a treaty.56 On the other hand, as the EU has only limited treaty-making
powers, treaties regularly accommodate the internal competence divide between the EU and itsMember
States (MS) by allowing for their parallel participation.57 Since internally the EU shares the environmental
competence with its MS, parallel participation is the regular case in MEAs.58
In the case of parallel participation, the EU and the MS participate as parties in their own right so
that they each owe their treaty partners fulfilment of the entire treaty.59 Nevertheless, treaty clauses
often require a clarification on the competence divide between the EU and its MS.60 The idea of a
declaration of competence is to provide more clarity on the respective responsibilities of the EU and
its MS under a treaty.61 This clarity is specifically relevant in case of disputes and alleged failures to
fulfil these responsibilities: legally, both the EU and its MS can be held accountable for fulfilment of the
entire treaty. Yet, factually, the competence divide at EU level indicates who – the EU or the MS – has the
actual ability to resolve the issue under dispute. The declaration of competence thus seeks to assist treaty
partners in identifying against whoma legal actionmay bemore promising.62 The question of who can be
held accountable poses itself similarly in compliance mechanisms in the event of parallel participation
when treaty institutions or other treaty partners trigger proceedings. A declaration of competences
required under the treaty may serve as a basis to judge this question. However, given the practical
difficulties with these declarations, a pragmatic alternative could be to allow for the joint participation of
the EU and its MS in compliance procedures.63
54See Ramses A Wessel and Joris Larik, ‘The European Union as a Global Legal Actor’ in Ramses A Wessel and Joris Larik (eds),
EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2020) 1, 2ff.
55e.g. art 20(1) Paris Agreement, UNTC No 54113.
56Marise Cremona, ‘Who Can Make Treaties? The European Union’ in Duncan B Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2nd
edn, OUP 2020) 117, 131.
57Note recently, Odermatt (n 6) 299f.
58Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann and ElisaMorgera, ‘The EU’s External Action after Lisbon’ inMarjan Peters andMariolina Eliantonio
(eds), Research Handbook on EU Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020) 77, 82.
59See further Allan Rosas, ‘The European Union and Mixed Agreements’ in Alan Dashwood and Christophe Hillion (eds), The
General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 200, 203ff.
60Safrin (n 5) 1338ff.
61Frank Hoffmeister, ‘Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the European Union and Its Member States’
in Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in the World (Hart
Publishing 2010) 249, 260.
62It is questioned, however, whether declarations of competences fulfil this function in practice as they are regularly quite vague
and, in any case, subject to the dynamic evolution of the internal competence situation; see Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, ‘EU
Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base?’ (2012) 17 European Foreign Affairs Review
491, 492. In a similar vein, Joni Heliskoski, ‘EU Declarations of Competence and International Responsibility’ in Malcolm Evans and
Panos Koutrakos (eds), The International Responsibility of the European Union (Hart Publishing 2013) 189, 206ff; Cristina Contartese
and Luca Pantaleo, ‘Division of Competences, EU Autonomy and the Determination of the Respondent Party: Proceduralisation
as a Possible Way-Out?’ in Eleftheria Neframi and Mauro Gatti (eds), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law (Nomos
2018) 409, 414ff.
63Note, though, on the co-respondent mechanism under the EU accession agreement to the European Convention on Human
Rights, Opinion of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 218ff.
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The case of parallel participation also requires special rules for the EU and its MS when it comes
to their party rights. With regard to voting rights, treaties or other (constituting) legal instruments
tend to include specific rules which seek to ensure that the EU and its MS do not exercise their rights
simultaneously.64 Instead, where the MS exercise their rights, the EU must abstain and vice versa.65
How the EU and its MS arrange this exercise of rights is generally an internal matter.66 However,
treaties may condition the participation of international organisations by the participation of their
constituting member States, thereby not providing the former with a fully autonomous status.67 In this
case, international law indirectly addresses the internal matter of the competence divide between the
EU and its MS, and forces them to act jointly.68 Any existing specific voting rules relating to treaty-based
institutions are also relevant to compliance mechanisms, in any case for the plenary political body at the
last stage of the procedure.
3.1.2. The EU’s autonomy
The principle of autonomy has been pointedly described as ‘part of the orthodoxy of EU law’.69 Indeed,
from an EU law perspective, the principle and its constituting elements are essential for arguing why the
EU legal order is distinct from that of international law.70 In this sense, its autonomy can be understood
as one of the EU’s unique characteristics.
In the context of the development or submission to external (quasi-)judicial control mechanisms,
the EU has indeed recurrently requested to have this autonomy accommodated. Evidence of this can
be found in relation to the EEA Agreement,71 which was renegotiated after the EU’s Court of Justice
(CJEU) judged it incompatible with the principle of autonomy.72 More recently, the Court found also the
accession agreement to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR) to be in breach of the EU’s autonomy,73 requiring the EU to renegotiate this agreement
in order to deliver on its constitutional promise.74 The principle of autonomy can thus prompt the
EU to make requests for special treatment,75 thereby making this principle relevant to external actors,
potentially, also to compliance institutions and treaty partners in the context of compliance mechanisms.
It was pointed out earlier that compliance mechanisms differ from external (quasi-)judicial control
mechanisms in their purpose.76 A further difference also lies in the effects of their respective decisions:
64Ramses A Wessel and Jed Odermatt, ‘The European Union’s Engagement with Other International Institutions. Emerging
Questions of EU and International Law’ in Ramses A Wessel and Jed Odermatt (eds), Research Handbook on the European Union
and International Organizations (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019) 2, 16.
65e.g. art 20(2) Paris Agreement. Note, though, that internally the MS are bound by the principle of loyalty in exercising their
party rights and thus need to take into account EU interests, Monica Claes and Bruno de Witte, ‘Competences: Codification and
Contestation’ in Adam Łazowski and Steven Blockmans (eds), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing
2016) 46, 67f.
66See, in this context, Joni Heliskoski, ‘Internal Struggle for International Presence: The Exercise of Voting Rights within the FAO’
in Alan Dashwood and Christophe Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 79. Highlighting
current challenges for external partners, see Wessel and Odermatt (n 64) 10ff.
67e.g. art VII(2)(c) and art XXIX(2) Canberra Convention, Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
1329 UNTS 47.
68Note on this point, Joined Cases C-626/15 and C-659/16, Commission v Council (AMP Antarctique) Judgment of 20 November
2018, EU:C:2018:925, paras 128ff.
69Panos Koutrakos, ‘But Seriously, What Is the Principle of Autonomy Really About?’ (2018) 43 European Law Review 293, 293.
70Engaging with the Court’s conception of ‘autonomy’, Christina Eckes, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order’ (2020) 4 Europe
and the World: A Law Review, doi:10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2019.19.
71Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ L1/3.
72Opinion of 14 December 1991, Agreement on the European Economic Area I, 1/91, EU:C:1991:490; Opinion of 10 April 1992,
Agreement on the European Economic Area II, 1/92, EU:C:1992:189.
73Opinion of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454.
74Note on this point, Christoph Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession After
Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 147; Adam Łazowski and Ramses A Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn into Locks: Opinion
2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 179.
75See Christophe Hillion and Ramses AWessel, ‘The European Union and International Dispute Settlement: Mapping Principles
and Conditions’ in Marise Cremona, Anne Thies and Ramses A Wessel (eds), The European Union and International Dispute
Settlement (Hart Publishing 2017) 7, 30; Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘The Axiological Emancipation of a (Non-)Principle: Autonomy,
International Law and the EU Legal Order’ in Inge Govaere and Sacha Garben (eds), The Interface Between EU and International
Law (Hart Publishing 2019) 45, 62; Luca Pantaleo, The Participation of the EU in International Dispute Settlement. Lessons from EU
Investment Agreements (T.M.C. Asser Press 2019) 43ff.
76See above, Section 2.
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while (quasi-)judicial decisions are binding on a party, non-compliance decisions are not; rather they
factually assist and softly put pressure on a party to act accordingly. Nevertheless, the Court’s recent
assessment of CETA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada,
may suggest that autonomy concerns are not exclusively confined to cases of binding (quasi-)judicial
decision-making.77 It is thus worth having a brief look at this case.
In its CETA Opinion,78 the Court first recalled certain competences that must not be accorded
to the respective tribunal in order to observe the EU’s autonomy. Unsurprisingly, it reaffirmed that
the decision whether a measure under scrutiny falls within the competence of the EU or the MS must
remain with the Court, as this was ultimately a question of EU law.79 In a similar vein, the Court restated
that the external body must not have the competence to interpret any type of EU law.80 Compliance
institutions are certainly not accorded the competence to provide an interpretation of EU law,81 binding
or otherwise. Yet, the issue of the competence divide may occur once a non-compliance procedure is
initiated in respect of either the EU or an MS and a domestic measure. While a decision by a compliance
institution on the correct respondent in the case would not have binding effect, it is unclear whether such
decision-making may still be considered problematic. A compliance institution could potentially avoid
deciding the competence question, though, if it always addressed the EU and its MS.82
In respect of the CETA, the Court was also prepared to make some concessions on the need
to protect the autonomy of the EU legal order. It found that the competences of the respective
tribunal were sufficiently limited in order not to impinge on the competences of the EU institutions:
the tribunal was competent neither to annul an EU measure nor to request that the EU render the
measure compatible with CETA.83 The competences of compliance institutions are limited in a similar
way inasmuch as their competence to find on a situation of non-compliance does not include the power
to directly eliminate the source of non-compliance. Instead, compliance institutions are empowered to
make recommendations84 and take predominantly supportivemeasureswhich allow a party to comeback
into compliance.85 With their decisions, compliance institutions can therefore not prescribe a certain
policy path for the EU should it be found non-compliant.86
Notably, in its Opinion, the Court then suggested that indeed factual pressures are also capable of
raising autonomy concerns. Specifically, it indicated that a competence to issue a penalty in respect of
the party in breach of treaty obligations would be problematic. Yet, also the award of damages could
exercise external pressure on the EU institutions, leaving them with no other option than revising their
policy choice.87 The issue of factual pressure may indeed be relevant in the context of compliance
mechanisms. After all, non-compliance decisions are public and thus generally accessible.88 The
inclusion of measures in response to a situation of non-compliance may thus subject the EU to external
(political) pressure to implement them.89 Within the treaty system, such pressure could result from
follow-up procedures seeking to verify whether parties actually rectify a situation of non-compliance.90
However, even if such pressure could be considered high, it would not necessarily leave the EU with no
other option than to revise a policy or legislative act. How the EU can rectify a situation of non-compliance
77In this vein, Ankersmit (n 2) 338f.
78Opinion of 30 April 2019, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, 1/17, EU:C:2019:341.
For the broader implications of the Court’s Opinion, see the Special Issue of Europe and the World: a law review, ‘Reflections on
Opinion 1/17 (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada – CETA)’.
79Opinion of 30 April 2019, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, 1/17, EU:C:2019:341,
para 132.
80Opinion of 30 April 2019, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, 1/17, EU:C:2019:341,
paras 134f.
81See Tanzi and Pitea (n 9) 580.
82Note though Opinion of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 218ff.
83Opinion of 30 April 2019, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, 1/17, EU:C:2019:341,
paras 141ff.
84Loibl (n 38) 436.
85See Ulfstein (n 27) 128.
86Ankersmit (n 2) 326.
87Opinion of 30 April 2019, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, 1/17, EU:C:2019:341,
paras 144ff.
88See Tanzi and Pitea (n 9) 576.
89See Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Compliance under the Evolving Climate Change Regime’ in Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin Gray and
Richard Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (OUP 2016) 120, 131.
90See above, Section 2.
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depends on the reason identified for non-compliance: it may be a failure to submit a report; it may,
however, also be an institutional practice lying at odds with treaty obligations. On a general level, it is
thus not likely that the pressures building around non-compliance decisions raise the same autonomy
concerns as indicated in the CETA Opinion.91 Yet, the fact that the Court even considered factual
pressure to be possibly problematic demonstrates the ongoing evolution of this principle in the case
law and should spark some wariness.
3.2. EU requests for special treatment in compliance mechanisms
Having shown how certain EU characteristics may prompt an EU request for special treatment in the
context of compliance mechanisms, it is appropriate to now turn to the practice. The following discusses
three case studies of non-compliance procedures in which the EU made requests for special treatment
by reference to its unique characteristics. While in some cases the EU special treatment was granted,
in others it was opposed. By taking the perspective of compliance institutions and treaty partners, the
focus in these case studies is to shed more light on whether and how the EU was treated differently from
other treaty parties following its requests.
3.2.1. Parallel participation of the EU and its MS: the case of an EU emissions ceiling
The first case study relates to an EU request for special treatment under the compliance mechanism of
the Gothenburg Protocol,92 which effectuates the LRTAP. The EU had acceded to the Protocol in 2003,93
joining its then 15 MS. Parties to the Protocol are required to limit their emissions of certain air pollutants
to specific levels set out in the Protocol’s Annex II.94 The EU is no exception in this regard: the Annex
includes an emissions ceiling also for the EU, which is the sum of its MS’ ceilings.
In 2012 the EU had reported on the 2010 and 2011 emissions of NOx from its 15MS. These emission
data reports revealed that emissions of NOx in the EU were well above the dedicated EU emissions
ceiling. Based on that information, the treaty’s Secretariat concluded that the EU was in non-compliance
with its obligations.95 The Secretariat therefore referred the EU to the treaty-based compliance body,
the Implementation Committee.96
In the proceedings before the Committee, the EU admitted that indeed, its report showed
emissions above its ceiling. Yet, it argued that the emission inventories of some of its MS would still
be subject to further adjustments. The exceedance of the emissions ceiling would thus probably be
further reduced.97 Appropriately, the non-compliance procedure should be suspended until the EU
MS had finalised their activities. The Committee rejected that EU request. It underlined that, while
the EU’s explanations are understandable, they did not justify emissions in excess of its ceiling. By
becoming a party to the Protocol, the EU had taken up the obligation to reduce emissions below a
fixed ceiling. This EU ceiling was absolute and not dependent upon the individual ceilings of its MS.98
Nevertheless, although not explicitly raised by the EU, the Committee considered whether the EU’s
nature as an international organisation required a different view on this point. However, the Committee
highlighted that the EU did not declare or argue it lacked competence to fulfil its obligation. It could
thus be presumed that it had the necessary ability to actually meet that obligation.99
91Ankersmit (n 2) 322; Nicola Notaro and Mario Pagano, ‘The Interplay of International and EU Environmental Law’ in Inge
Govaere and Sacha Garben (eds), The Interface Between EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2019) 151, 177. Also prior to
the CETA Opinion, Alì (n 1) 521, 533f.
92Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and
Ground-level Ozone, 2319 UNTS 81. In 2019 an amendment to the Gothenburg Protocol entered into force which extends its
scope of application to particulate matter, including black carbon, Amendment of the text and annexes II to IX to the Protocol to
the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone
and the addition of new annexes X and XI.
93Council Decision of 13 June 2003 on the accession of the European Community, to the Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone [2003] OJ L179/1.
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The Committee agreed with the EU, though, on how to understand the EU emissions ceiling. It
accepted that an emissions ceiling typically relates to a specific territory. At the time of the case, the
EU’s territory indeed comprised that of 28 individual States. However, when the EU acceded to the
Protocol, only 15 States were MS of the EU. Thus, the EU emissions ceiling had to be understood to
relate to the territory of its first 15 MS.100
In view of these considerations, the Committee adopted a draft decision on the compliance matter.
In that decision it found that the EU was in non-compliance with its emissions reduction obligations.101
The Executive Body as the treaty’s plenary political body, without further discussion,102 adopted this
decision.103
In this case, the compliance institutions followed up only one of the EU requests, the one in relation
to the interpretation of the EU’s emissions ceiling. The compliance body accepted that an obligation
relating to the territory of a treaty party requires distinct considerations in respect of an international
organisation. Specifically, it would require taking into account the development of the EU since its
accession, and the type of obligation it undertook with its accession. While the compliance body refers
in these considerations to the special nature of the EU as an international organisation, it is difficult to see
how a State party would be treated differently. Accepting that an emissions ceiling relates to a territory,
as the Implementation Committee clearly argued, a change in a State party’s territory since its treaty
accession would also have to be taken into account. While for a State party this situation may arguably
be less likely to occur than for an international organisation, the considerations still lead to the same
conclusion. The fact that the Implementation Committee followed up the EU’s request as regards the
interpretation of its emissions ceiling can thus not be understood as special treatment.
In respect of the EU’s first request, relating to its treaty performance, the compliance body did not
come to understand that the EU’s nature as an international organisation warrants special treatment: the
EU’s reference to its factual dependence on theMS for fulfilling its reduction obligation was not accepted.
Rather, the Implementation Committee highlighted how the EU is a treaty party like all others. As a party
in its own right, the EUmust be prepared to deliver on the obligations it undertook. However, the related
considerations of the Implementation Committee indicate that it would have been prepared to take the
EU-MS competence situation into account – something that international law does not demand.104 While
in this instance the EU request was not successful, inasmuch as the EU was not treated differently as a
result, the special nature of the EU clearly had a bearing on the compliance body’s considerations. It
is questionable, though, whether, in view of the emphasis on the equality of the EU with other treaty
parties, this case can actually be considered as one pointing to exceptionalism.
3.2.2. Alternative forms of dispute settlement: the case of party-to-party triggering
The second case study relates to an EU request for special treatment under the compliancemechanismof
the Water Convention, a framework convention which requires its parties to prevent, control and reduce
transboundary impact on transboundary surface waters and groundwaters.105 The EU had become a
party to the Convention in 1995.106 To date, 25 EU MS are also parties to the Convention.
At its first meeting, the Convention’s compliance body, the Implementation Committee, started
discussing an EU-specific situation which had transpired elsewhere: the European Commission had
submitted a legal note with regard to party-to-party submissions by EU MS to the compliance body
under the EspooConvention.107 The records from themeeting of the Implementation Committee do not
reveal the argument made in that note.108 Yet, after liaising with the compliance body under the Espoo





104See art 27(2) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between
International Organizations.
105Art 3 Water Convention.
106Council Decision of 24 July 1995 on the conclusion, on behalf of the Community, of the Convention on the protection and use
of transboundary watercourses and international lakes [2005] OJ L186/44.
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note, the European Commission had argued that EU law prevented EUMS from relying on State-to-State
triggers. Thus, EU MS would be barred from initiating non-compliance procedures in respect of each
other and in respect of the EU. What the EU thus effectively sought was to limit the scope of application
of the compliance mechanism in respect of its MS.
Interestingly, the Implementation Committee decided to consider how EU law could be understood
in this context. It traced the argument back to Article 344 TFEU,111 which it understood to prevent EU
MS from submitting a dispute concerning a treaty to which the EU and its MS are parties to external
judicial control. However, the Implementation Committee rejected that this EU law requirement had
any relevance for the respective compliance mechanism. It argued that the Convention, in its Article
22, would indeed provide for dispute settlement. Yet, the compliance mechanism was designed as
an alternative to such dispute settlement. Unlike methods of dispute settlement, the compliance
mechanism would serve the purpose of avoiding disputes rather than settling them. Therefore, and
due to their non-binding nature, procedures before the Implementation Committee would ‘not infringe
on [EU] competence’.112 As a result, special procedures and criteria for dealing with party-to-party
submissions by EU MS were not considered further.
The relevant report of the Implementation Committee was presented at the 2019 MoP.113 The
records of this meeting indicate that the EU representative in the MoP did not object to the conclusion
by the Implementation Committee.114 The issue was not discussed further in the MoP.
This case is quite interesting for two reasons. First, the EU request for special treatment is motivated
not only by an issue of EU law, but also by a provision of primary law which is considered to constitute
an element of the EU legal order’s autonomy.115 The request may thus be an indication of at least the
existence of autonomy concerns also in respect of compliance mechanisms from an EU point of view.116
Second, the compliance body was prepared to consider the request and the underlying EU-specific
characteristic on their merits. However, once the compliance body concluded that special treatment was
not a necessary requirement from the viewpoint of international law, it did not discuss the matter further
– conduct reminiscent of investment tribunals, which have also tended to reject the EU law argument
against their jurisdiction.117 Nevertheless, the compliance body’s approach to the special request may
suggest that the body would have been prepared to accord special treatment to the EU and its MS if
it was necessary as a result of EU law. Even then, it is unclear whether such treatment could indeed be
seen as special, and thus a case of exceptionalism. The answer would depend on how other parties
are treated when they request an exception from the scope of application of a compliance mechanism
based on their internal law.
3.2.3. Maintaining the EU judicial review system: the case of recommendations
The last case study discusses the earlier sketched EU request for special treatment in the context of the
compliance mechanism under the Aarhus Convention. In 2005 the EU acceded to the treaty,118 which
requires its parties to grant the public certain procedural environmental rights: access to environmental
information, participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice in environmental
matters.119 Ireland was the last of the EU MS to ratify the treaty in 2012.
In 2008 the eNGOClientEarth made a submission to the Convention’s compliance body, the Aarhus
Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC).120 The eNGO argued that the situation regarding judicial





115Pantaleo (n 75) 55ff.
116See above, Section 3.1.2.
117See, e.g., Theodoros Adamakopoulos and others v Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No ARB/15/49, Decision on Jurisdiction,
7 February 2020, paras 139f. However, in this case, one arbitrator found that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction based on intra-EU
considerations, see Statement of Dissent of Professor Marcelo G Kohen, 3 February 2020.
118Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on access
to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L124/1.
119For an overview, see Jeremy Wates, ‘The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for Environmental Democracy’ (2005) 2 Journal
of European Environmental & Planning Law 2, 2ff.
120UNECE, ‘Communication of 1 December 2008 to the Aarhus Convention’s Compliance Committee by ClientEarth’ https://
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/communication/Communication.pdf accessed 19 July 2021.
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this situation would be created through the so-called Aarhus Regulation.121 This legal act would only
allow for judicial review of selectedmeasures by EU institutions, and only by environmental organisations.
Individuals would thus be limited in their right to judicial review. In addition, the Court’s jurisprudence
on legal standing for individuals but also organisations would make access to justice in environmental
matters virtually impossible.122
The ACCC decided to consider the communication in two parts;123 part II related to the issue of
access for the public to the EU courts. The ACCC continued proceedings in relation to part II of the
communication in 2015 with a public hearing to discuss the substance of the communication.124 In its
subsequent draft findings it found the EU to be non-compliant with Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention,125
which incorporates a right for the public to access to justice in environmental matters. In this context, the
ACCC also drafted recommendations for how the EU should ensure observance of its obligations in the
future. One of these recommendations was that the CJEU should take fuller account of these obligations
when it interprets and assesses EU law.
The EU was invited to comment on these draft findings before their adoption by the Committee.126
In its comments, the EU strongly opposed the recommendations drafted in relation to the Court: these
recommendations would ‘ignore, with all due respect, the specific features of a regional economic
integration organisation like the EU, with its special institutional framework and unique legal order’.127
The comments went on to highlight the Court’s central role, forming an essential element of the
autonomy of the EU legal order. Specifically, whether the Court takes into account the obligations under
the Aarhus Convention was to be decided by the Court itself. An international agreement like the Aarhus
Convention could not affect the allocation of powers as fixed by the Treaties.128 Upon accession of the
EU to the Aarhus Convention, no amendment of these Treaties had been demanded by international
partners.129
The EU comments then sought to highlight how the ACCC had failed in assessing the EU situation
correctly. In particular, the ACCC had disregarded the evolving nature of the Court’s case law and
had only taken into account case law until a certain ‘cut-off’ date. Yet, it had not considered pending
cases in its assessment, which could have further developed the Court’s Aarhus jurisprudence, even
though those had been pointed out by the EU representative.130 Of those pending cases, the ACCC
had specifically dismissed from its assessment cases resulting from preliminary reference procedures.
Thereby, the ACCC had failed to grasp the specific nature of the EU and its system of judicial protection,
of which the preliminary reference procedure is an essential part.131 This argument was also central to
demonstrating that the EU judicial system would ensure access to justice in environmental matters ‘to a
sufficient degree’:132 while natural or legal persons may not always have a right to challenge EU law of
general applicability at EU level, they would certainly have the possibility to plead the invalidity of such
an act in domestic procedures. The possibility and also obligation of domestic courts to call on the CJEU
121Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] OJ L264/13.
122For background on the legal situation, see Femke de Lange, ‘Beyond Greenpeace, Courtesy of the Aarhus Convention’ in Han
Somsen (ed), Yearbook of European Environmental Law (OUP 2003) 227, 229ff.
123UNECE, ‘Letter of 28 August 2009 to the party concerned and the communicant’ https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
pp/compliance/C2008-32/correspondence/toC-32partiesconcernedRedeferral2009.08.28.pdf accessed 19 July 2021.
124UNECE, ‘Letter of 13 May 2015 to the communicant’ https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/
correspondence/toCommC32_invitation_to_discussion_CC49.pdf accessed 19 July 2021.
125UNECE, ‘Draft findings and recommendations of 27 June 2016 by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee with regard
to Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) concerning compliance by the European Union in connection with access bymembers
of the public to review procedures’ https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/From_Party/C32_EU_
Draft_findings_for_parties__comments.docx accessed 19 July 2021.
126UNECE, ‘Letter to the party concerned inviting its comments’ https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/
C2008-32/From_Party/ToPartyC32_draft_findings.pdf accessed 19 July 2021.
127UNECE, ‘Comments by the European Commission, on behalf of the European Union, to the draft findings and
recommendations by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee with regard to Communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II)
concerning compliance by the European Union in connection with access by members of the public to review procedures’ https://
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/From_Party/frPartyC32_18.10.2016_comments_draft_findings.pdf
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for a preliminary ruling in such cases would then guarantee the review of the legality of EU acts. This
interaction between the EU and the MS level in the system of jurisdictional protection was crucial for the
subject matter of the Convention, for which the EU and the MS share competences.133
After receiving the comments by the parties to the proceedings, the ACCC finalised and adopted
its findings in 2017.134 In doing so, the ACCC maintained its finding of non-compliance by the EU
and included its recommendation in relation to the Court for adoption by the Convention’s MoP. In
the submitted version, the recommendation relating to the CJEU was twofold. It suggested, for one
part, that the CJEU should assess the legality of the EU’s implementing measures in the light of the
obligations under the Aarhus Convention. For another, the CJEU should interpret EU law to the effect
that it is consistent with the objective of the access to justice provisions.135
The MoP discussed the findings and recommendations as part of draft Decision VI/8f the same
year.136 In this discussion, the EU again raised concerns about the proposed recommendations. The
records only include a general reference to ‘the specificity of the European Union legal system’ in this
regard.137 However, the internal EU discussion, leading to the EU position for these MoP discussions,138
reveals more: in their internal EU discussion, the EU MS were concerned about the system of judicial
protection under EU law.139 By deleting the recommendations in respect of the Court, it should
be clarified that the MoP ‘does not intend to require the EU to interfere with the independence of
its judiciary’.140 In line with that position, the EU representative in the MoP requested that those
recommendations be deleted. Even then, the representative asked that the recommendations only be
taken note of by the MoP instead of being endorsed.141
The records of the MoP meeting highlight that party delegates participating in the discussion
generally did not share the EU’s concerns. In particular, they were not convinced that the non-compliance
decision challenged the EU’s system of judicial review. Instead, the representative of Norway suggested
that the EU ‘seemed to be seeking for itself a kind of special status as a Party to theAarhusConvention’.142
Instead of defying the recommendations as a threat to its judiciary, it should consider them as a list
of possible measures to come into compliance. The MoP, nevertheless, engaged with the substance
of the concerns which had motivated the EU request. In that context, upon the delegates’ invitation,
the ACCC’s chairperson clarified the function of the recommendations attached to any findings of
non-compliance: they would serve the Committee as a measure to later assess whether the treaty
party had implemented the respective findings. However, the chairperson stressed that the party still
remained ‘free to choose various ways to address the non-compliance found’.143 In other words, the
recommendations would not bind the party to the indicated way forward.
Ultimately, the delegates found that the EU’s position was not legally substantiated. The EU’s
request should thus not be accommodated.144 For this eventuality, the EU representative had announced
that it would reject the adoption of the non-compliance decision. Again, this EU position caused strong
opposition among its peers: by its action, the EU would undermine the authority of the MoP. If it rejected
the adoption of the decision, the EU would ultimately threaten the strongly voiced commitment of treaty
parties to consensus.145 In the end, due to the EU’s opposition, theMoP indeed failed to reach consensus
on the adoption of the respective non-compliance decision. Thereby, as noted in the meeting records,
the MoP deviated from its consistent practice of endorsing all of the findings by the ACCC. What could
be agreed, though, was to continue discussions on the matter at the next ordinary meeting in 2021.146
133ibid, paras 25f.
134Findings and recommendations of the Compliance Committee with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (part II)




138Council Decision (EU) 2017/1346 of 17 July 2017 on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union, at the sixth
session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention as regards compliance case ACCC/C/2008/32 [2017] OJ L186/15.
139For more details on the (diverging) views of the EU institutions also on this aspect, see Fasoli and McGlone (n 40) 43.
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It was again concerns about its autonomy as one of its unique characteristics that prompted the EU
requests for special treatment in this case. The requests, however, are made in respect of two different
sets of issues: the request concerning the different way of confirming the compliance body’s findings,
‘taking note’ instead of ‘endorsing’, may be considered more of a procedural issue. However, the
request as to the deletion of the recommendation in the non-compliance decision effectively concerns
the competences of the compliancemechanism in relation to the EU. The discussions in the political body
were much more focused on that second request, which may indicate that it was more of a concern to
treaty partners. Nevertheless, in approaching this request, treaty partners, again,147 showed awillingness
to consider the substance of the EU’s request and explored whether the non-compliance decision would
have the effects the EU was concerned about. Yet, considering the legal effects of non-compliance
decisions under international law, EU international partners did not judge special treatment for the EU
to be necessary. Rather, they emphasised how the EU had the same obligations, under the treaty and
the compliance mechanism, as other treaty parties and thus had the same position in the treaty system.
This emphasis on equality may even be an indication that the EU’s international partners have begun to
consider the EU’s requests as being fuelled by an effort ‘to have a freer hand’ than others and are seeking
to counteract this.148
4. EU participation in compliance mechanisms: special or
exceptional?
The above case studies provide the opportunity for some tentative conclusions as regards the
EU’s participation under compliance mechanisms. Under these mechanisms, the EU’s requests for
special treatment appear to be motivated by those unique characteristics which it also seeks to have
accommodated in other international settings: its nature as an international organisation and its
autonomy. In all of the instances discussed, treaty institutions and treaty partners showed a willingness to
consider the respective characteristic. This willingness may point to a more general perception that the
EU is just ‘not a normal treaty actor’,149 and its participation is likely to require accommodating to some
extent; or, it is simply a reflection of the facilitative nature of the compliance mechanism, which takes
into account the situation, factually and legally, of a party.150 Specifically in view of the EU’s autonomy
and its comprising elements, though, it is unclear whether external actors actually consider these as
unique characteristics. The case under the Aarhus Convention may be indicative of external actors
being inclined to understand autonomy concerns as simple issues of internal law and not being ready to
accommodate them.
In the cases discussed, treaty institutions and treaty partners predominantly refused to grant the EU
the requested treatment. While they considered the argument made, and even engaged with its EU law
side, they decided on the request purely based on whether EU special treatment was necessary under
international law. This focus on necessity may be considered a slightly different approach than at the
stage of treaty-making where the EU receives special treatment by means of REIO clauses, yet, not only
where this is necessary for it to join an agreement, but also to accommodate its, often political, practice
of mixity.151 If that difference in approach were accepted, it could be explained in light of the stages
of treaty relations: at the stage of treaty-making, treaty partners define how they want to enter these
relations. In contrast, compliance mechanisms relate to the implementation stage of a treaty and thus
unfold against agreed-upon commitments. Accommodating a special situation at this stage, specifically
if it were to limit the commitment a party undertook earlier, would be legally possible; yet, politically, it
is clearly difficult to square also with the cooperative nature of a compliance mechanism and may thus
warrant a stricter approach to the issue.
In the cases analysed, even where the EU received the treatment it requested, it is questionable
whether, as a result, the EU was actually treated differently from other treaty partners. Indeed, the
compliance body based its solution as to the interpretation of an emissions ceiling on necessity in view
147See Section 3.2.2.
148Nolte and Aust (n 8) 414.
149Odermatt (n 6) 293.
150See, e.g., art 15(2) Paris Agreement, which establishes the compliance mechanism and requires its body, quite broadly, to ‘pay
particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties’.
151Safrin (n 5) 1337.
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of the EU’s unique characteristic. Yet, it is to be expected that State parties would actually be treated
just the same.152 Ultimately, all instances of EU participation in the compliance mechanisms studied do
not qualify as situations of ‘European exceptionalism’ in the general sense: they lack the element of a
different treatment of the EU compared to other treaty partners. Yet, the situations clearly indicate those
EU characteristics that continue to be a topic in international cooperation with the EU.
Despite not constituting situations of ‘European exceptionalism’, the insights the case studies
provided can still inform research in this area, particularly those parts that are interested in whether
and how the EU is treated differently internationally: an understanding of when and why the EU is not
treated differently following a request for special treatment is certainly helpful for refining situations of
(actual) ‘European exceptionalism’ and for illuminating why these situations occur.
5. Concluding remarks
The EU’s participation in compliance mechanisms is an area of the EU’s international engagement which
has not received much attention so far. The present article sought to change that and studied the EU’s
participation in these treaty-based environmental control mechanisms through the lens of ‘European
exceptionalism’. In doing so, it could demonstrate that the past indicates how certain unique EU
characteristics may prompt EU requests for special treatment under compliance mechanisms. Yet, cases
taken from compliance practice showed that such requests are not generally accommodated. Ultimately,
based on the cases of EU participation in compliance mechanisms studied here, the EU’s participation
cannot be described as a further phenomenon of ‘European exceptionalism’. Yet, the situations
clearly indicate those EU characteristics that mark its international action, and perhaps challenge its
international partners.
While the present article did not confirm further instances of ‘European exceptionalism’ in the EU’s
international action, it may still provide a valuable input to this research strand. Research situated within
the concept of ‘European exceptionalism’ has so far mainly focused on the stage of treaty-making on the
international plane. The situations studied here, however, relate to the stage of treaty implementation
and offer a slightly different picture of the EU’s behaviour and treatment. It could thus be interesting
to use the lens of ‘European exceptionalism’ for the analysis of other situations at the level of treaty
implementation. In this way, research may get a little closer to obtaining a fuller picture of the EU as an
international actor and partner.
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